Altruism and conditions of worth

This article draws inspiration from a paper published here.

The word altruism was first coined by the French philosopher Auguste Comte (1798–1857), who made it the cornerstone of his ‘positivist’ philosophy. Taken from the Latin ‘alter’ (‘other’ – ‘other-ism’), Comte defined it as “living for others”, in contrast to egoism.

According to Comte – who is widely regarded as the ‘father of sociology’ (a term he also coined) – ‘sympathetic instincts’ must prevail over ‘selfish impulses’, and ‘sociability’ over ‘personality.’ Altruism, for Comte, is also associated with the ‘feeling of attachment’, which evolves in three stages: love and veneration for the individual mother (always good by definition), then love of the fatherland (which, he argued, must become love of the motherland), and finally, the love and worship of humanity. Humanity itself was to be worshipped through what Comte called the ‘Religion of Humanity’ – a utopian system centered on the symbolic figure of the ‘Virgin-Mother,’ whom he envisioned as the embodiment of Humanity itself:

⁠“This positivist Virgin-Mother must represent Humanity, which includes the living, the dead, and future human beings, but not all humans are part of it. Humanity incorporates only the ‘truly worthy dead,’ those who have ‘cooperated in the common existence.’ Those who are not part of it are considered ‘parasites’ who only came into the world to ‘make manure.’”

Under this system, worth is conditional upon selflessness, and by extension, conformity to the collective standard or ‘Great Supreme Being’. Since such selflessness was not, according to Comte, innate to all, he believed a dictatorship might be necessary to enforce it:

⁠“It should be remembered that Comte believed that a transitional dictatorship would probably be necessary to establish the positivist society he dreamed of.”

Since egoism is deemed evil and selflessness good, altruism requires not only the renunciation of physical ‘impulses’ but also of independent convictions. To hold to one’s own beliefs and convictions – at times, at the expense of the convictions and / or beliefs of others – is to act selfishly. Altruism therefore demands the sacrifice not just of body, but also of mind.

Here we see the beginnings of what Carl Rogers later described as the split between the ‘organismic self’ and the ‘conditioned self’. The ‘organismic self’ refers to the authentic self that lives in ‘congruence’ – a state where inner experience, values, and outward behavior are aligned. The ‘conditioned self’, by contrast, is shaped by ‘conditions of worth’ imposed from outside, where a person feels valuable only if they meet certain standards. In Comte’s system, that essential ‘condition of worth’ is selflessness; one is valued only to the extent one serves the collective.

In effect, altruism demands that the individual become ‘enmeshed’ – a psychological term describing blurred or dissolved personal boundaries, where selfhood is subordinated to others. Enmeshment creates chronic guilt, anxiety, and dependency, because one’s value is tied to constant self-sacrifice. It is therefore a primary psychological consequence of Comte’s moral system. Enmeshment ultimately undermines self-esteem, since the individual’s central moral concern is not how to live his life but how to sacrifice it. It undermines respect for others, who are reduced to helpless beings in need of rescue. And it breeds resentment, as self-actualisation must be suppressed in favour of enabling others.

An example of the inner turmoil produced by this morality can be found in the work of R. Díaz-Guerrero, Research Professor of Psychology at the National University of Mexico, in his book Psychology of the Mexican Culture where ‘enmeshment’ is shown to be a defining feature of Mexican family morality:

“The Mexican family is founded upon two fundamental propositions: (a) the unquestioned and absolute supremacy of the father and (b) the necessary and absolute self-sacrifice of the mother.”

⁠“But what seems to be even more commonplace in one degree or another is the existence in the Mexican male of a syndrome for which the common denominator is guilt.”

⁠“From this vantage point one could say that many of the neurosis-provoking conflicts in the Mexican are ‘inner’ conflicts, that is, provoked more by clash of values than by clashes of the individual with reality.”

Moreover, by making service the central issue of ethics, altruism destroys the possibility of authentic kindness or benevolence. If the highest value is duty or service to others, then kindness or benevolence is no longer motivated by love, but by obligation – which in effect makes it impossible to value or love anyone or anything authentically, including oneself.